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I.   INTRODUCTION 
California was at the forefront of medicinal cannabis legalization 
in 1996.1 That was twenty years ago. Today, twenty-three states, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of Columbia have all passed 
laws legalizing the use of cannabis for medical purposes.2 Three of 
these states plus the District of Columbia have also legalized the rec-
reational use of cannabis.3 However, despite the aggregate of state 
protections and changing public opinion, both medical and recrea-
tional use of cannabis remains illegal under federal law.4 This under-
lying conflict between state and federal law creates significant uncer-
tainty for cannabis businesses and their employees.   
                                                                                                                                 
  J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2016; B.A. Communication, Uni-
versity of Maryland, College Park, 2011. I want to thank Professor Mary Ziegler for 
providing insight into federal labor law, and for her invaluable help throughout the pro-
cess. I am also grateful for the love and support of my family throughout my academic 
endeavors. 
 1. 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016).  
 2. Id.; Puerto Rico Governor Signs Order to Legalize Medical Marijuana, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/04/ 
puerto-rico-medical-marijuana_n_7203916.html; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-
laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2016). 
 3. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 2.  
 4. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)-(c), 829 (2012). Under the Con-
trolled Substances Act, cannabis is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance. § 812(c). 
This is the most restrictive category and signifies Congress’s conclusion that cannabis has 
no medicinal value and cannot be legally prescribed. See id. § 812(b); see also Racketeer 
Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).  
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Since the advent of state-authorized medicinal cannabis, scholars 
have thoroughly explored the employment law issues raised by legal-
ization.5 This discussion concerns various topics, ranging from drug-
free workplace policies to mandatory drug screening and employment 
discrimination. Additionally, employer practices and resulting law-
suits have prompted consideration of the legal ramifications of em-
ployees using cannabis.6 However, current literature does not ade-
quately address how state and federal law may regulate employment 
within the industry itself given the prevailing federal criminal prohi-
bitions still governing cannabis.7 This unique situation has left one 
federal agency to regulate an industry that another is tasked with 
eliminating.  
Recently, due to the expanding nature of the cannabis industry, 
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) has 
agreed to hear multiple labor cases involving claims that cannabis 
employers engaged in unfair labor practices. The federal Office of 
General Counsel of the NLRB released an Advice Memorandum 
(“Memo”) recommending what this Note terms the “Wellness Ap-
proach”8—reasoning that the NLRB should exercise jurisdiction to 
investigate unfair labor practice claims against cannabis enterpris-
es.9 This Note offers the first meaningful analysis of the NLRB’s pro-
posed approach, evaluating whether extending the protections of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) to cover the can-
nabis industry is feasible as a matter of statutory interpretation or 
policy.  
                                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally Jay S. Becker & Saranne E. Weimer, Legalization of Marijuana 
Raises Significant Questions and Issues for Employers, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2014, at 66; Mat-
thew D. Macy, Employment Law and Medical Marijuana—An Uncertain Relationship, 
COLO. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 57; Michael D. Moberly & Charitie L. Hartsig, Smoke – and Mir-
rors? Employers and the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July/Aug. 2011,  
at 30. 
 6. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008) (upholding the 
right of the employer to terminate its employee, a qualified medical cannabis patient, after 
he failed a drug screening); see also Len Iwanski, Medical Marijuana Law Doesn’t Protect 
Workers, MISSOULIAN (Apr. 4, 2009), http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/ 
article_2f5ef0f7-fab3-50fe-8f48-914c716fd23a.html (“In July 2006, Mike Johnson tested 
positive for marijuana in a random drug test. The company said the 25-year employee 
could return to work if he submitted to additional drug tests and passed them. He refused 
and was fired.”). 
 7. See Elizabeth Rodd, Light, Smoke, and Fire: How State Law Can Provide Medical 
Marijuana Users Protection from Workplace Discrimination, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1759 (2014). 
 8. This Note’s argument that the Board should exert jurisdiction will be referred to 
as the “Wellness Approach” because the NLRB Memo is not law, nor is it binding on the  
Board. 
 9. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. of Advice, 
NLRB, to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. Region 1 (Oct. 25, 2013) [hereinafter NLRB Memo-
randum], http://www.managementmemo.com/files/2014/08/01_CA_104979_10_25_13_.pdf. 
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Ultimately, this Note argues that the NLRB should exercise juris-
diction because cannabis legalization will continue to expand at the 
state level,10 allowing more citizens to be employed in an industry 
where workers’ rights remain unclear. While Congress continues to 
leave major questions facing the cannabis industry unanswered, the 
Board will serve as a vehicle to address interstitial labor issues. The 
Board’s decision will not only validate the nascent cannabis industry, 
but it will also help expose dormant labor conflicts. Cannabis indus-
try employees deserve the same labor rights guaranteed to all other 
workers in the American economy under the NLRA.11 
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part II discusses the background 
of the cannabis industry as well as the gap in state and federal law 
protecting employees in the industry. Part III examines the mechan-
ics of the NLRA, the jurisdictional bounds of the Board, and the re-
cent NLRB Memo, which suggested jurisdiction. Part IV explores the 
Wellness Approach, applying it in the context of the law on unfair 
labor practices under the NLRA. Additionally, Part IV argues that 
the NLRB should apply the Wellness Approach and bring employees 
of the cannabis industry under the protection of federal labor law. 
Part V addresses the core challenges that will likely arise in applying 
labor law to the cannabis industry. This Note will conclude by pro-
posing various ways the NLRB can improve labor law jurisprudence 
in the fledging American cannabis industry.  
II.   AN INDUSTRY CLOUDED UNDER SMOKE 
Ian Brodie quit his job at Wellness Connection, a company that 
operates multiple marijuana-growing facilities and dispensaries, due 
to his frustration with company management and their failure to ad-
dress widespread employee grievances.12 Brodie, along with other co-
workers, also suffered illnesses stemming from working in a facility 
with pesticides and mold.13 When employees expressed their griev-
ances through legally protected organizing, they were issued discipli-
nary warnings, unlawfully interrogated, and made to believe that 
any union activities were under surveillance.14 The employer’s  
                                                                                                                                 
 10. Cannabis sales are estimated to hit $3.1–3.6 billion in total revenue by 2016. See 
Chris Walsh, US Medical Marijuana Sales to Hit $1.5B in 2013, Cannabis Revenues Could 
Quadruple by 2018, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Mar. 21, 2013), https://mmjbusinessdaily.com/ 
us-medical-marijuana-sales-estimated-at-1-5b-in-2013-cannabis-industry-could-quadruple-
by-2018. 
 11. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).  
 12. Dave Jamieson, Medical Marijuana Workers Have the Same Labor Rights  
As Everyone Else, Feds Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2014, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/27/medical-marijuana-unions_n_4860793.html. 
 13. See id.  
 14. Id. 
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retaliatory actions were in direct violation of federal labor laws.15 
Employees in any other industry would be protected and could seek 
relief under multiple federal laws; but, since this company produces, 
cultivates, and dispenses cannabis, it is stuck in a gray area as to 
whether it should be considered within the scope of federal jurisdic-
tion. If it is, this would mean that federal laws administered by the 
U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, and the NLRA, among many others, have 
not been adequately enforced within the cannabis industry.16   
The issues raised by Mr. Brodie’s case and others like it have re-
ceived little attention from the courts, scholars, or policymakers. 
With some states providing legal access to medical marijuana, com-
mentators have debated the protections that should be available to 
workers prescribed to use cannabis. As the Brodie situation makes 
clear, however, current discussion has mostly missed an equally im-
portant issue—the rights of workers in the cannabis industry itself. 
The Brodie example follows a pattern seen in a troubling number of 
cases—cannabis workers being taken advantage of due to the lack of 
federal oversight.17 Brodie’s case highlights the implications of the 
inconsistency between state and federal cannabis laws—an incon-
sistency causing increasing uncertainty regarding the rights of em-
ployees who work for state-sanctioned dispensing organizations. Alt-
hough states have passed marijuana legislation to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens, the lack of federal oversight may 
lead to serious abuse of employees.18 Section II.A explores the nature 
of the emerging cannabis industry, illuminating how and why it 
leaves employees open to exploitation. 
A.   The American Cannabis Industry 
The cannabis sativa plant and its derivative products are classi-
fied as a Schedule I narcotic under the Controlled Substances Act of 
                                                                                                                                 
 15. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-159 (2012).  
 16. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012); Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).  
 17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-159 (providing federal oversight mechanisms for employees  
covered under the Act); Jamieson, supra note 12; see also Hilary Bricken, Marijuana Workers 
and Unions: The 4-1-1, CANNA LAW BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/ 
marijuana-workers-and-unions-the-4-1-1/; Jan Hefler, Growing Pains: Labor Strife at N.J.’s 
First Medical Marijuana Dispensary, PHILLY.COM (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://articles.philly.com/2015-01-30/news/58591595_1_marijuana-dispensary-marijuana-
industry-marijuana-regulations.  
 18. See Michael Hiltzik, How We Know Marijuana Industry Is Maturing: Unfair La-
bor Practice Complaints, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-marijuana-industry-unfair-labor-complaints-20150317-column.html.  
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1970 (“CSA”).19 Although the CSA prohibits the possession, cultiva-
tion, and distribution of cannabis,20 twenty-three states, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the District of Columbia have all established rules, regu-
lations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments that le-
galize some variation of its use.21 The states that allow the produc-
tion, sale, and use of cannabis have created a budding industry, es-
timated to be worth $1.5 billion in revenue.22 By 2018, industry reve-
nue is predicted to grow to $6 billion.23 Due to federal laws banning 
medical cannabis, the regulation of the industry is left primarily to 
each respective state.24  
As the use of medical cannabis gains public approval, the rights of 
workers in the industry will remain cloudy and complicated by regu-
latory inconsistencies and ambiguities.25 The legal responsibilities of 
cannabis enterprises differ from companies that are regulated by fed-
eral law. Yet, on the state level, each state that has legalized canna-
bis has established its own regulations.26 States with legalized can-
nabis enforce comprehensive regulations to ensure safety, privacy, 
and accountability within the industry. For example, among many 
other requirements, California requires all medical cannabis dispen-
saries that apply pesticides to their harvest to obtain an operator 
identification number from the County Agricultural Commissioner.27 
These dispensaries must continue to send the pesticide use reports 
on a monthly basis to the Commissioner’s office.28 Maine also imposes 
significant regulations after the state passed the Maine Medical Use 
                                                                                                                                 
 19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1249 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The CSA 
constitutes Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control  
Act., § 100, 84 Stat. at 1242. The CSA provides a statutory framework for the federal gov-
ernment to regulate the lawful production, possession, and distribution of controlled sub-
stances. See §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. at 1242-84. 
 20. See §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. at 1242-84. 
 21. 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1; Puerto Rico Governor 
Signs Order to Legalize Medical Marijuana, supra note 2. 
 22. Walsh, supra note 10. 
 23. Jon C. Ogg, Estimated $10 Billion Marijuana Sales in 2015 Far Too Low, 24/7 
WALL ST. (May 23, 2015, 9:20 AM), http://247wallst.com/consumer-products/2015/05/23/ 
estimated-10-billion-marijuana-business-sales-in-2015-far-too-low/.  
 24. See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 5 n.1 (2013) (citing state statutes governing marijuana).  
 25. See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 787 
(2004). 
 26. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 453A.502 (2014) (showing that Nevada state law 
requires cannabis cultivation facilities to strictly label each of its products).  
 27. Pesticide Use on Marijuana, DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REG., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/ 
water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/cannabis_enfrcmnt/pesticide_use_on_marijuana.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 28. Id.  
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of Marijuana Act in 2009.29 The Act delegated authority to Maine’s 
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) as the princi-
ple agency to regulate the state’s new medical marijuana industry.30 
The DHHS published a comprehensive set of rules, including, among 
other requirements, that all medical cannabis employees secure a 
registry identification card from DHHS before affiliating or working 
at any state dispensary.31 During the mandated application process, 
each medical cannabis employee must also pass a background check 
conducted by DHHS.32 Moreover, cannabis dispensaries are required 
to have written employment contract policies, procedures, and job 
descriptions; to contract with approved employee assistance pro-
grams; and, to maintain an alcohol and drug-free workplace policy.33 
Furthermore, as public opinion and laws have evolved nationwide, 
the federal government has, in rare cases, recognized aspects of the 
industry by enforcing a limited but growing number of federal regu-
lations. For instance, financial institutions working with state-
sanctioned cannabis businesses are now required to file a Marijuana 
Limited Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with federal authorities.34 
The SAR discloses whether the business is following the govern-
ment’s guidelines with regard to revenue derived exclusively from 
legal sales.35 Additionally, in May 2014, the U.S. House of Represent-
atives passed a bill to protect states with medical cannabis laws from 
federal interference.36 Congress emphasized its commitment to such 
policy by passing the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appro-
priations Act of 2015 (“Cromnibus Act”). Under this spending bill, 
Congress prevented the use of federal funds to prosecute individuals 
acting under state-approved medicinal marijuana laws.37  
                                                                                                                                 
 29. ME. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2421-2430 (2014).  
 30. See 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. §§ 1-11 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 31. Id. § 8. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. § 6. 
 34. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-G001, BSA 
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 3 (2014), www.fincen.gov/ 
statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf. 
 35. See id.  
 36. H.R. 4660, 113th Cong. (2014). Representative Rohrabacher (R-CA) offered House 
Amendment 748 to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Bill to prohibit the use of funds to prevent states from implementing their own laws that 
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. H. Amdt. 
748, 113th Cong. (2014). The GOP-controlled House produced a 219-189 vote. Final Vote 
Results for Roll Call 258, OFF. OF THE CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (May 30, 
2014), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll258.xml; see also Ryan J. Reilly & Matt Ferner, 
House Blocks DEA from Targeting Medical Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2014, 
12:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/30/dea-medical-marijuana-house-
vote_n_5414679.html.  
 37. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 
128 Stat. 2130 (2014); see Matt Ferner, Congress Passes Historic Medical Marijuana Protections 
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Nonetheless, as long as cannabis remains illegal under the CSA, 
state protections for industry workers will be dangerously incom-
plete. States have no obligation to extend protections to industry 
workers and may offer varying levels of protection. As the cannabis 
industry expands throughout the states, it will employ a growing, 
significant workforce to harvest, process, and sell cannabis and its 
derivative products. Therefore, it will become imperative for federal 
labor laws to be applied and enforced to protect the industry and its 
participants. Part III begins by examining how the National Labor 
Relations Act may apply to the cannabis industry. First, Part III de-
velops an account of the purposes of the NLRA and the authority 
conventionally exercised by the National Labor Relations Board. 
Next, Part III studies the NLRB’s recent analysis of its jurisdiction in 
cannabis cases.  
III.   AMERICAN LABOR LAW  
A.   The National Labor Relations Act 
As state legalization spreads across the United States, an in-
creased demand for cannabis has triggered the creation of larger, 
more sophisticated cannabis dispensaries and enterprises.38 One such 
enterprise is the California Harborside Health Center, which earned 
approximately $20 million in gross revenues in 2008.39 Yet, despite 
employing more than seventy-five full-time workers, the Oakland-
based dispensary and its employees are uncertain whether federal 
labor laws, such as the NLRA, govern and protect their rights.40  
The NLRA is the foundational federal labor law aimed at protect-
ing workers’ rights and balancing employer needs.41 The NLRA guar-
antees basic rights for private sector employees, including the right 
to organize into trade unions and engage in collective bargaining for 
better wages.42 The NLRA is designed to “curtail certain private sec-
tor labor and management practices, which can harm the general 
welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”43 To imple-
ment the policies of the NLRA, sections 153–156 of the Act estab-
                                                                                                                                 
in Spending Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/12/14/congress-medicalmarijuana_n_6317866.html?utm_hp_ref=tw.  
 38. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND 
PROHIBITION POLITICS 61-75 (2004). 
 39. Angela Woodall, Marijuana Laws Spur Small Businesses in Oakland, Elsewhere, 
INSIDE BAY AREA (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_13679216. 
 40. See id.  
 41. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).  
 42. Id. § 157. 
 43. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-
labor-relations-act (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
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lished the NLRB to oversee investigations and to remedy unfair labor 
practices.44 Congress designed the NLRA to rectify the “inequality of 
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are 
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association.”45 
 As the principal enforcer of the NLRA, the NLRB was created 
to oversee the process by which employees decide whether they want 
to be represented by a labor organization and prosecute labor viola-
tions.46 The NLRB is authorized to prevent unfair labor practices and 
to adjudicate hearings, all of which may be appealed through the 
court system.47 To ensure compliance with the Act, the NLRB has 
been delegated broad investigatory powers and has the authority to 
issue subpoenas, examine evidence, and conduct investigations.48 
 In many cases, the NLRB clearly has jurisdiction over em-
ployers and employees; however, the Act specifically restricts the 
Board’s authority over agricultural laborers; supervisors; federal, 
state, or local government workers; independent contractors; and 
workers covered under the Railway Labor Act.49 In the case of the 
cannabis industry, however, the answer is far less obvious. Would 
affording employees’ rights under the NLRA impermissibly conflict 
with federal drug policy? Should labor law more broadly apply to an 
industry considered illegal as a matter of federal law as well as the 
laws of many states? Section III.B follows and considers how the 
NLRB traditionally exerts jurisdiction and how it may enforce it in 
the cannabis realm.  
B.   The National Labor Relations Board 
The Supreme Court has “consistently declared that in passing the 
[NLRA], Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest 
jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Com-
merce Clause.”50 Section 2(2) of the NLRA contains language that 
“vests jurisdiction in the Board over ‘any’ employer doing business in 
this country save those Congress excepted with careful particulari-
ty.”51 However, if a labor dispute’s effect on commerce is not suffi-
ciently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction, section 
                                                                                                                                 
 44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156. 
 45. Id. § 151. 
 46. Id. §§ 153, 155. 
 47. Id. § 160.  
 48. Id. § 161. 
 49. Id. § 152; see also Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 74-487, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936) 
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2012)). 
 50. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963). 
 51. India v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1986); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).  
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14(c)(1) of the NLRA provides the Board discretionary authority to 
decline jurisdiction.52 Although section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA makes it 
clear when the Board cannot decline jurisdiction over a particular 
labor dispute,53 there are still many categories that the Board has 
traditionally decided not to control.  
Throughout its history, the Board has declined to exert jurisdic-
tion over various groups of employers, including charitable organiza-
tions, non-profits, small intrastate firms, as well as the horseracing 
and dogracing industries.54 The Board would not exercise jurisdiction 
because the employers were either “small, local, and did not signifi-
cantly affect commerce”55 or because the employers were already 
heavily regulated by a sovereign state or international entity.56 The 
effects of a labor dispute are not the sole reason the Board may uni-
laterally decide not to exercise jurisdiction. If the employer is based 
in an industry characterized by “temporary and sporadic employ-
ment,” then the Board has historically not exerted control because of 
the significant difficulties in administering the Act in that context. 57  
Today, many of the Board’s historical exclusions are limited or  
reversed.58 For instance, the Board no longer declines jurisdiction  
                                                                                                                                 
 52. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012). But see Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208, 213 
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (concluding that the Board’s discretion was not without limit and that the 
Board could not, on the basis of advisory opinions, refuse jurisdiction over labor issues 
involving categories or groups of employers without first promulgating a rule or holding a 
hearing).  
 53. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1); Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251, 255-56 
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (stating Board standards for jurisdiction existing on August 1, 1959). 
 54. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; see, e.g., Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972) (declining jurisdiction 
over a law firm consisting of four to six attorneys where the firm limited the majority of its 
practice in Arizona); Horseracing and Dogracing Industries, 38 Fed. Reg. 9537 (Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. Apr. 16, 1973) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.3) (declining jurisdiction over 
horseracing and dogracing industries, in part, because local and state laws decide dates for 
tracks’ racing and set a percentage share of the gross wages that would go to the state; the 
states licensed employees and retained the right to effect termination to employees whose 
activities put at risk the integrity of the industry; and a “unique and special relationship” 
existed between these industries and the states because the industries made up a large 
source of revenue). 
 57. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7; see Horseracing and Dogracing Indus-
tries, 38 Fed. Reg. at 9537; see also Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 11 (Dec. 14, 2012).  
 58. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7; see, e.g., Kansas AFL-CIO, 341 N.L.R.B. 
1015, 1018-19 (2004) (adopting the ALJ’s decision to reject respondent’s position that be-
cause it was engaged mostly in state lobbying conduct, the Board should not exercise juris-
diction); Lighthouse for the Blind of Hous., 244 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1145 (1979) (showing that 
the Board, moving forward, will not differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit organi-
zations for jurisdictional analysis); Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 456-57 (1977) 
(overruling the Board’s past determination that it should refuse jurisdiction over particular 
law firms); R.I. Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1976) (“[T]he only basis 
for declining jurisdiction over a charitable organization is a finding that its activities do not 
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simply because a state or foreign entity already exerts significant 
control over the employer.59 Additionally, the Board now refuses to 
exclude intrastate companies that are already heavily regulated by a 
state.60 
The Board has authority over retail enterprises that produce an 
annual gross business volume of at least $500,000 and fall within the 
Board’s statutory jurisdiction.61 Based on these standards, the Board 
concluded in its advisory Memo that a cannabis enterprise is within 
the Board’s jurisdiction so long as it meets the Board’s monetary ju-
risdictional thresholds.62 The Board came to this conclusion for sev-
eral reasons. First, Congress had already delegated this authority to 
the Board; second, a labor dispute in the cannabis industry could 
have substantial effects on interstate commerce; and finally, public 
policy considerations necessitate the Board to act.63 However, the 
Board’s recommendation to exercise jurisdiction raises important 
questions about how to resolve an obvious conflict between the CSA 
and federal labor law. This Part turns next to a detailed examination 
of the NLRB Memo. 
                                                                                                                                 
have a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant the exercise of the Board’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
 59. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7-8; see, e.g., Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. 
Charter Sch., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 10-11 (Dec. 14, 2012) (rejecting the argument that 
the Board should discretionarily refuse authority over charter schools because of the signif-
icant state involvement where respondent received eighty percent public funding, where 
educators were required to be certified under the state school code and participate in the 
same assessments mandated of public school educators, and where respondent was subject 
to various other state regulations); see also Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975) 
(rejecting the argument that the Board should use its discretion to decline jurisdiction over 
the Jai Alai industry where the state mandated that all workers be licensed and that 
eighty-five percent be citizens of the state, retained authority to accept managerial work-
ers, and employed residents directly to maintain the integrity of the sport and the  
gambling polices).  
 60. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8; see, e.g., Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 
N.L.R.B. 1355, 1357-58 (1995) (showing that when deciding if the NLRB should exercise 
jurisdiction over an employer that has ties to a foreign government, the Board should only 
determine if the employer fits under the definition of “employer” under section 2(2) of the 
NLRA, and if that employer hits the monetary standards); State Bank of India, 229 
N.L.R.B. 838, 842 (1977) (concluding that there is no public policy that justifies the Board 
to continue to decline jurisdiction on the basis that the employer is an “agency” or “instru-
mentality” of an international state); cf. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1972) (declining to assert jurisdiction where a state direct-
ly controlled a nonprofit university to the extent that the university was deemed to be a 
quasi-public institution).  
 61. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 89 (1958); see NLRB Memoran-
dum, supra note 9, at 8.  
 62. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8.  
 63. Id.  
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C.   The NLRB Memorandum 
In 2013, employees of the Wellness Connection of Maine claimed 
that the cannabis-dispensing organization engaged in unfair labor 
practices and conducted union-busting activities.64 The United Food 
and Commercial Workers International Union (“UFCW”), which 
maintains a Medical Cannabis and Hemp Division,65 petitioned the 
Board to hear the case, and for the first time in U.S. history, the 
Board accepted the petition.66 Yet, because the CSA renders all can-
nabis businesses illegal under federal law, it was unclear whether 
employees of an illegal enterprise could seek redress under federal 
labor laws that technically do not apply. Ultimately, the parties 
agreed to a settlement, and the charges were dismissed;67 but the 
Board’s Associate General Counsel Barry J. Kearney nonetheless re-
leased an Advice Memorandum detailing how the Board should regu-
late labor disputes in the cannabis industry.68 It is important to note 
that a formal decision by the agency or a court has never been issued, 
and although the Memo is persuasive authority, it does not have 
force of law, nor is it binding on the Board.  
 The Memo addressed two concerns: (1) whether the Board 
would exercise jurisdiction over an enterprise that commercially 
grows, processes, and sells medical cannabis; and (2) whether the 
workers, who process cannabis that has already been cultivated and 
harvested by other workers, should be classified as agricultural la-
borers and thus not considered “employees” under section 2(3) of the 
NLRA.69 The Memo first discusses the medical cannabis industry and 
the difficulties employees face due to the federal prohibition of 
                                                                                                                                 
 64.  Id. at 1-2.  
 65.  See Cannabis Workers Rising, UFCW, http://cannabisworkers.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016) (showing that the UFCW maintains “Cannabis Workers Rising,” a campaign 
that gives a voice to employees in the medical marijuana retail industry); see also Samuel 
P. Jacobs & Alex Dobuzinskis, Marijuana Industry Provides Hope for Shrinking Labor 
Unions, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013, 12:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/02/06/marijuana-industry_n_2627699.html; Stu Woo, Teamsters Organize  
Medical Marijuana Growers, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703305004575504370924866534 (last updated Sept. 21, 2010, 12:01 AM).  
 66. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1; see also Candice Zee, NLRB An-
nounces Intent to Become Involved in the Commercial Marijuana Business, EMPLOYER LAB. 
REL. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.employerlaborrelations.com/2014/08/08/nlrb-
announces-intent-to-become-involved-in-the-commercial-marijuana-business/. 
 67. Joshua Rhett Miller, Union Gripe Brings Federal Labor Agency into Marijuana 
Debate for First Time, FOX NEWS (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/03/ 
05/federal-labor-agency-enters-medical-marijuana-debate-for-first-time.html. 
 68. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9. 
 69. Id. at 1; see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
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cannabis.70 The Memo also explains, in particular, the medical  
cannabis industry in Maine, as well as the business procedures of the 
charged party, The Wellness Connection.71  
In 2009, Maine officially legalized the use of medical cannabis for 
qualified patients by passing the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana 
Act.72 By 2015, cannabis had become the highest valued cash crop 
industry in Maine, with an approximate value of $78 million.73 
Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) was 
tasked with issuing a detailed set of rules to regulate the new indus-
try.74 The DHHS rules require individuals interested in joining or 
working for a cannabis dispensary to pass a background screening 
and obtain a registry identification card.75 In addition, DHHS rules 
instruct all dispensaries to establish personnel policies, procedures, 
and job descriptions and to maintain a drug-free workplace policy 
and employment contract policies.76  
Wellness Connection of Maine, the largest medical cannabis en-
terprise in the state, operates four large dispensaries.77 In 2013, sev-
eral Wellness Connection employees complained to management 
about health and safety hazards within the dispensaries, specifically 
their exposure to illegal pesticides.78 Management refused to 
acknowledge the complaints.79 In response, the employees staged a 
walk-out from one of Wellness Connection’s growing facilities.80 The 
workers then tried to organize, alleging that Wellness Connection 
retaliated against the workers because of the protest and conducted 
several intrusive interrogations.81 The employees also claimed that 
the Wellness Connection facilities often lacked sterility and con-
tained a high presence of mold.82 The UFCW agreed to represent the 
Wellness Connection employees and filed a claim with the Board  
                                                                                                                                 
 70. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 3-5.  
 71. Id. at 1-5. 
 72. ME. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2421-2430 (2014).  
 73. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4; Seth Koenig, Federal Prohibition of Med-
ical Marijuana Continues to Handcuff Now-Legal Industry in Maine, BANGOR DAILY  
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013, 12:35 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/06/health/federal-
prohibition-of-medical-marijuana-continues-to-handcuff-now-legal-industry-in-maine/ 
(stating that the signature wild blueberry industry of Maine is being surpassed by canna-
bis harvest).  
 74. See 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. §§ 1-11 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 75. Id. § 8.  
 76. Id. § 6.  
 77. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1. 
 78. See Koenig, supra note 73. 
 79. See Jamieson, supra note 12. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-2; Koenig, supra note 73. 
 82. See Jamieson, supra note 12. 
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alleging that Wellness Connection engaged in unlawful surveillance, 
interrogation, and retaliatory discipline and discharge, violating sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.83  
Although the parties reached a settlement, the Board still made 
the decision that an enterprise involved in the cannabis industry is 
within the Board’s jurisdiction because (1) the Board has clear  
authority to assert jurisdiction, (2) a labor dispute involving the  
industry could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and 
(3) policy considerations do not compel the Board to decline.84 Finally, 
the Board concluded that the Wellness Connection’s processing assis-
tants should be classified as covered “employees” as defined under 
the Act.85 
The first jurisdictional hurdle addressed in the Memo is the fact 
that cannabis producers and distributors may intend to keep their 
business operations wholly intrastate.86 However, similar to the au-
thority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause,87 the Memo 
suggests that any potential intrastate issue should not limit the 
Board’s reach.88 The Memo explained that Wellness Connection is a 
substantial enterprise, which employs over fifteen production and 
processing assistants and services over 3000 of Maine’s 4500 regis-
tered cannabis customers.89 Wellness Connection purchases enough 
out-of-state supplies to reach the Board’s non-retail monetary stand-
ard and “has gross revenue sufficient to meet the Board’s retail 
standard.”90 The Memo went on to explain that the cannabis industry 
as a whole has evolved into a large-scale economy, no longer bound 
by state lines.91 The industry employs thousands of Americans, some 
of whom are represented by unions and covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements.92 Based on these facts, the Memo concluded that a 
                                                                                                                                 
 83. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-2; see National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 
U.S.C. § 158 (2012).  
 84. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8. 
 85. Id. at 15; see National Labor Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 86. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 9. 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 88. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6-9; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1, 19 (2005) (concluding that the CSA is clearly within Congress’s commerce power because 
“production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has 
a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that  
commodity”).  
 89. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.  
 90. Id. at 9. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
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labor dispute at Wellness Connection, or any other employer in the 
cannabis industry, could “adversely affect out-of-state suppliers or 
interstate channels of commerce.”93  
The Memo noted that this was not the first time the Board would 
be asserting jurisdiction in an industry already heavily regulated by 
the state.94 The mere fact that the employer’s business is already 
strictly regulated by the state of Maine is immaterial because the 
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction can “function concurrently with state 
regulation.”95 Further, just because an employer violated one federal 
law “does not give it license to violate another.”96 Therefore, the 
Board should exercise jurisdiction over employers in the cannabis 
industry, notwithstanding the federal prohibitions.97 The Memo com-
pared this jurisdictional policy to that of the U.S. Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration, another federal agency that currently 
exerts authority over similar cannabis enterprises that directly vio-
late the CSA.98 Additionally, it was noted that the Board maintained 
jurisdiction over companies in direct violation of the Immigrant Re-
form and Control Act (“IRCA”) because the companies were employ-
ing illegal immigrants.99  
Finally, the Memo addressed whether Wellness Connection em-
ployees should be classified as processing assistants or as agricultur-
al laborers.100 This is an important distinction because “agricultural 
laborers” will not be considered “employees” under section 2(3) of the 
NLRA.101 For purposes of classification, the Memo stated that the 
Board should derive the meaning of the term “agricultural laborer” 
from the definition of “agriculture,” as defined under section 3(f) of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).102 In determining 
whether the workers are agricultural laborers or processing assis-
                                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 11. 
 97. Id. at 10.  
 98. Id.; see also Inspection No. 893552.015 – Wellness Connection of Maine, OSHA, 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=893552.015 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016) (providing information about the Occupational Safety & Health Administra-
tion’s inspection of Wellness Connection). 
 99. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 10-11 (noting that in the immigration con-
text, “[a]ny limitations on the Act’s applicability . . . have been strictly remedial in na-
ture”); see, e.g., Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 47, Case No. 29-CA-25476, 
at 2-4 (Aug. 9, 2011).  
 100. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11. 
 101. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). 
 102. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11; see Fair Labor Standards Act of  
1938 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (2012); see also Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 
300 & n.6 (1977) (noting that Congress has “tied the definition of ‘agricultural laborer’  
in § 2(3) of the NLRA to § 3 of the FLSA.”).  
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tants, the Memo analyzed the employer’s processing operation.103 The 
Memo noted that the employer’s “processing operation transforms the 
cannabis plants from their raw and natural state and therefore is 
more akin to manufacturing than agriculture.”104 The Memo contin-
ued to discuss how the employer’s processing functions are not sub-
ordinate to the employer’s farming operations.105 Ultimately, the 
Memo found that the Wellness Center’s processing assistants are in-
deed statutory employees entitled to the full protection of the 
NLRA.106 The Memo based this conclusion on the fact that the pro-
cessing function of the company was not purely to prepare cannabis 
for the market; rather, it was “a valuable part of its operation that 
utilizes significant labor and equipment to transform cannabis plants 
from their natural state into retail medical marijuana products.”107  
For the above reasons, the Memo concluded by making two im-
portant findings. First, it is within the Board’s authority to assert 
jurisdiction over the Wellness Connection, and second, the Wellness 
Connection’s workers are processing assistants and therefore covered 
by the Act.108  
IV.   THE WELLNESS APPROACH 
The Wellness Approach will likely not end the debate about how—
and whether—labor laws should cover the cannabis industry. This 
Part explores whether the Board should adopt the Wellness Ap-
proach going forward. The NLRA was intended to be a broad, prophy-
lactic law.109 One of the principle rationales behind the Act was to 
limit obstructions to free commerce, checking unfair labor practices 
and restoring a fair balance of bargaining power in American indus-
                                                                                                                                 
 103. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 12-13.  
 104. Id. at 13. The Memo’s finding does not rely on the fact that the employer made 
tincture or kief when most of the claimed unfair labor practices happened. Id. at 13 n.55. 
Even though tincture and kief production obviously changed the raw and natural cannabis 
product, the Memo’s conclusion was based on the Wellness Center’s operations at the time 
of the Board’s decision, which did not include production of tincture or kief. Id.   
 105. Id. at 13-15; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 780.145-147 (2014) (showing DOL regulations 
listing more factors to decide whether activities are incident to or in conjunction with farm-
ing operations).  
 106. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 15. 
 107. Id.; see Camsco Produce Co., Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 905, 908 n.18 (1990) (explaining 
that when a worker is engaged normally in both primary agricultural work and nonagricul-
tural work, a limited size of nonexempt work will be “inadequate to tip the scales” to bring 
the work under the protection of the Act; thus, the Board rightfully imposes a substantiali-
ty requirement in those instances).  
 108. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11, 15. 
 109. William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintain-
ing Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 46 
(2006).  
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try.110 However, recent worker abuse in the cannabis industry clearly 
demonstrates the growing need for the Board’s intervention.111 Exer-
cising jurisdiction over cannabis enterprises meets both objectives of 
the original law while ensuring cannabis employees are not abused 
by their employers. Additionally, exercising jurisdiction over canna-
bis enterprises is consistent with the scope of other federal agencies 
and brings clarity to an evolving industry.   
This Part begins by establishing that extending the Board’s juris-
diction over the cannabis industry naturally follows from a principled 
interpretation of the NLRA. There are at least three reasons why the 
Board should exert jurisdiction and enforce federal labor laws to pro-
tect employees of the American cannabis industry: (1) the terms “em-
ployer” and “employee” as defined in the NLRA have been interpret-
ed broadly; (2) courts will give considerable deference to the Board’s 
reasonable interpretations;112 and (3) a decision to extend coverage of 
the Act to such workers is consistent with the Act’s avowed purpose. 
Next, this Part argues that the policy benefits of extending jurisdic-
tion outweigh the costs.  
A.   The Board’s Jurisdiction Is Consistent with the NLRA 
Extending NLRB jurisdiction over the cannabis industry naturally 
flows from a principled interpretation of the NLRA. The broad statu-
tory interpretation of the term “employer,” as used in section 2(2) of 
the NLRA, appears to include cannabis companies.113 Subject to lim-
ited enumerated exceptions, section 2(2) broadly defines “employer” 
as “any person acting as an agent of an employer.”114 The breadth of 
section 2(2)’s definition is clear: the Act objectively applies to “any 
person.”115 The only limitations are specific exemptions for federal, 
state, and local government agencies, labor organizations, and any 
person subject to the Railway Labor Act.116 Since cannabis enterpris-
es are not among the few groups of employers expressly exempted by 
Congress, they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of 
                                                                                                                                 
 110. See generally id. 
 111. See Jamieson, supra note 12; Beth Quimby, Pot Dispensary Workers Rally in  
Portland, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/04/ 
06/medical-pot-workers-protest-in-portland/.  
 112. Here, “reasonable” means that the Board’s interpretation is supported by substan-
tial evidence based upon the record as a whole, even if the court would have made a differ-
ent choice when considering the matter under de novo review. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) 
(2012); N.L.R.B. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, Inc., 258 F.3d 305  
(4th Cir. 2001). 
 113. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id.; see also id. §§ 201-219 (listing sections of the FLSA and its exceptions); 45 
U.S.C. §§ 151-165 (2012) (defining the Railway Labor Act and its exceptions). 
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“employer.”117 Excluding cannabis employers from the Act’s protections 
would be inconsistent with basic tenets of statutory construction.118  
In many cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated how broadly 
“employer” may be defined.119 For instance, in NLRB v. E. C.  
Atkins & Co., the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and upheld the Board’s determination that plant 
guards are “employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the 
NLRA and are therefore entitled to the full protection of the Act.120 
The Court noted that Congress did not attempt “to spell out a de-
tailed or rigid definition of . . . an employer.”121 The Court recognized 
that the term “employer” is more inclusive than the technical and tra-
ditional common law definitions because the term draws “substance 
from the policy and purposes of the Act, the circumstances and back-
ground of particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts 
of industrial life.”122  
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, the Supreme Court again reject-
ed conventional limitations behind the term “employer.”123 In this 
case, Hearst Publications, the publisher of four daily Los Angeles 
newspapers, refused to bargain collectively with its newsboys.124 The 
newsboys attempted to form a local union by filing a petition for cer-
tification from the Board.125 The Board concluded that the newsboys 
should be considered full-time employees under the NLRA and or-
dered the publishers to bargain with the newsboys.126 Upon Hearst 
Publication’s petition for review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order, reasoning that the 
newsboys were independent contractors rather than employees.127 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Board’s determi-
nation that the newsboys are employees covered by the Act.128 The 
Court concluded that the broad language of the Act’s definitions 
“leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in 
doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than techni-
cally and exclusively by previously established legal classifica-
                                                                                                                                 
 117. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
 118. See Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc., No. 10 Civ.7242 (PAE), 2011 WL 6013844, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2011).  
 119. See, e.g., NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 401-03 (1947). 
 120. Id. at 415. 
 121. Id. at 403. 
 122. Id. 
 123. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). 
 124. Id. at 113.  
 125. Id. at 114.  
 126. Id.  
 127. See id. at 114-15.  
 128. Id. at 113. 
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tions.”129 In reviewing the legislative history of the NLRA, the Court 
found that Congress did not limit the terms with definite meaning, 
but rather intended to derive its meaning from the context of the 
NLRA.130 Thus, the Court held that the NLRA’s terms must be inter-
preted broadly enough as to correct the harms that the statue aimed 
to address.131 
In administrating the NLRA, the Board has accrued expertise and 
experience in employment relationships spanning numerous indus-
tries.132 The Supreme Court has recognized and acknowledged that 
this experience puts the Board in the best position to interpret the 
boundaries of the NLRA.133 Congress created the Board to administer 
the NLRA and, in doing so, delegated the power to define the terms 
of the Act.134 Courts should give considerable deference to the Board 
and its construction of NLRA terms.135 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court is likely to uphold any reasonably defensible interpretation of 
“employer” by the Board.136 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit acknowledged this judicial deference in Jefferson County v. 
NLRB.137 The court noted that the Board’s construction of its own 
statutory jurisdiction, like determining whether unfair labor practic-
es have been committed, should be entitled to great respect.138  
Additionally, by extending the protections and coverage of the 
NLRA to workers in the cannabis industry, the Wellness Approach 
will be consistent with the Act’s declared purpose to: 
[E]liminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the 
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstruc-
tions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of negoti-
ating the terms and conditions of their employment.139 
                                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. at 129. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 129-30.  
 132. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 133. See id.; Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can 
We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 126 (2003). 
 134. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 130-31. 
 135. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. (Chi. Stamping Plant) v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496-97 
(1979); NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron 
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).  
 136. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891. 
 137. Jefferson Cty. Cmty. Ctr. for Developmental Disabilities v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 122 
(10th Cir. 1984), overruled by Aramark Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 138. Id. at 124. 
 139. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
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If cannabis companies are to be excluded from federal labor laws, 
then a subdivision of employers without the same legal incentives  
to practice safe workplace policies as other covered employers may 
place a substantial burden on commerce by “impairing the efficiency, 
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce.”140 This  
potential employer subdivision is part of an industry that is fully  
integrated in local, state, and national economies, employing thou-
sands of workers who are unable to safeguard their proper interests. 
Denying cannabis employees the same rights as other American 
workers may eventually lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
unrest, which Congress planned to address under the NLRA.141 With 
the NLRA, Congress intended to protect collective bargaining rights 
by ensuring that there was no subclass of employers without a  
comparable interest in minimal workplace standards as other legal 
enterprises.142 The Wellness Approach will be consistent with these 
core NLRA goals.  
B.   The Board’s Jurisdiction Makes Sense as a Matter of Policy 
Not only would the Wellness Approach carry out congressional in-
tent, but it would also create good public policy. The Wellness Ap-
proach would provide federal oversight to check unfair labor practic-
es, restore a fair balance of bargaining power in the industry, and 
promote consistency with existing federal policy.   
Extending the coverage of the NLRA to workers in the cannabis 
industry is consistent with the Act’s objective of protecting the rights 
of employees and encouraging certain private sector management 
practices that benefit the overall welfare of workers, businesses, and 
the U.S. economy.143 In enacting the NLRA, Congress was cognizant 
of how capitalism can create an inevitable struggle between two com-
peting interests in the workplace.144 An employer’s profit motive will 
drive them to seize as much from labor as possible, and workers often 
must endure these efforts to secure their own material compensa-
                                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. (noting the Act’s declaration that it is the policy of the United States to elimi-
nate the causes of obstruction to the free flow of commerce); see also NLRB. v. Jones   
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23 n.2 (1937) (quoting the language found in 29 U.S.C.   
§ 51 to demonstrate the United States’ policy to eliminate causes of obstruction to the free 
flow of commerce).  
 141. See Ellen J. Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution Under the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 11, 23 (1997) (not-
ing the importance protecting workers collective bargaining rights through the NLRA). 
 142. Id.; see James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections 
and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 958 (1996). 
 143. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 
(1944). 
 144. See RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (1979). 
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tion.145 This struggle manifests itself across every major industry in 
the United States and, if left unchecked, may significantly hamper 
the free flow of commerce.146 However, the two competing interests 
are not irreconcilable. An industry should seek to balance the inter-
ests of employers with the rights of its workers. Unionism, supported 
by the power of strikes, can significantly improve the workers’ posi-
tion via collective bargaining agreements and shop-qualified floor 
representation, while also limiting employer abuse.147  
Allowing the Board to exercise jurisdiction will not only restrict 
unfair labor practices but will also reimpose a fair balance of bargain-
ing power. The Wellness Approach would encourage employers to 
take steps to deter workplace policies that might generate evidence 
typical of unfair labor practices. Just as the NLRA successfully en-
couraged employers to set up fair procedures in legal industries,148 
the Wellness Approach is likely to reduce instances of unfair labor 
practices in the cannabis industry. 
A recent conflict arising between the Compassionate Care Foun-
dation of New Jersey and its employees manifests the inherent ne-
cessity for federal labor standards.149 When the New Jersey-based 
cannabis dispensary faced financial difficulties, management told its 
employees to “voluntarily” take a temporary sixty-day pay cut and 
defer full payment for a later date.150 Eventually, the employees 
asked management to restore their full salaries and hours.151 Man-
agement refused to acknowledge their pleas and announced that the 
employees would not receive their promised back pay.152 The workers 
organized and petitioned to join a labor union in hope that they could 
collectively apply enough pressure to bring management to the bar-
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gaining table.153 Nevertheless, the Compassionate Care Foundation 
blocked the workers from joining the union and retaliated against 
participating employees by cutting their hours and wages.154 Man-
agement’s response was in clear violation of multiple provisions of 
the NLRA.155 To insulate itself from liability, the Compassionate Care 
Foundation reclassified its employees as agricultural laborers, one of 
the limited exemptions under the Act.156 Cannabis employers have 
attempted to use the ambiguous legality of the industry to justify 
otherwise questionable practices, leaving their employees vulnerable. 
The potential for employee abuse is compounded because many 
workers in the cannabis industry are the kind of low-wage, low-skill 
workers most in need of labor law protections.157  
Far too many companies are inclined to participate in unfair em-
ployment practices when their workers are replaceable and have no 
avenue of recourse. For instance, a Seattle-based cannabis dispensa-
ry doing business as A List MMJ (“MMJ”) characterized its employ-
ees as volunteers and refused to reimburse them for their work.158 
MMJ also established polices that not only prevented workers from 
communicating with one another about wages, but also prevented 
them from speaking to the news media about workplace conditions.159 
The employees were eventually terminated after they participated in 
organized activities to obtain their unpaid wages.160 In an attempt to 
equalize this bargaining position, cannabis industry workers from 
across the country started to organize and seek representation by 
various trade groups, including the United Food and Commercial 
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Workers (“UFCW”).161 The UFCW reported that the union’s newly 
formed Medical Cannabis and Hemp Division now represents “thou-
sands of medical cannabis workers” throughout the United States.162 
For example, employees at Otsego-based Minnesota Medical Solu-
tions ratified a contract under the auspices of the UFCW, Local 1189, 
best known for representing supermarket employees and food pro-
cessing workers.163 The UFCW has also organized cannabis workers 
in other states, including California, Colorado, and Washington.164 
The union represents cannabis workers involved across the entire 
production chain, such as employees involved in basic horticulture, 
harvesting, extraction, distribution, and retail.  
Granting cannabis workers the same federal statutory protections 
as other American workers creates a stronger incentive for manage-
ment to review, investigate, and resolve employee grievances.165 Us-
ing the Board as a vehicle to advance cannabis labor rights will not 
create more lawsuits; instead, it will foster a workplace in which law-
suits are limited. This is because labor disputes will be addressed, 
not by the courts, but between two equally positioned bargaining par-
ties, such as an employer and the employees organized as a union.166  
If the Wellness Approach is enacted, it will promote coherency and 
consistency of federal agency regulation. For instance, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) issued similar advisory memos in Octo-
ber 2009 and June 2011, which advised federal prosecutors that it 
was not an efficient use of federal resources to prosecute “individuals 
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing 
state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”167 The most 
recent advisory memo, released by Deputy Attorney General James 
M. Cole (“Cole Memo”), outlined the enforcement priorities of the 
DOJ and how compliant cannabis enterprises might mitigate risks 
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adverse to these priorities.168 The Cole Memo aims to limit federal 
enforcement in states with strong regulatory infrastructures.169 The 
Cole Memo underscores the agencies’ expectation that state govern-
ments will implement effective regulatory and enforcement systems 
that address the threat the cannabis industry might pose to law en-
forcement interests, such as public health and safety.170 In February 
2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“DOT”) also issued a memo-
randum giving financial institutions more leeway in accommodating 
cannabis businesses.171 The stated purpose of the memo was to bring 
the economic activity out of the shadows and into auditable, tractable 
transactions.172  
The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”) is yet another federal agency that has exercised jurisdic-
tion and conducted investigations throughout the cannabis indus-
try.173 The OSHA investigations and the violations discovered indi-
cate both the risks cannabis workers face and the need for stronger 
worker representation.174 Additionally, federal confidentiality laws, 
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), are also constantly enforced within the industry.175 Such 
enforcement emphasizes the federal government’s desire to strike a 
balance between protecting the rights of cannabis employees and 
regulating an illegal industry. Thus, the Wellness Approach can 
bring American labor law into line and encourage consistency with 
the approach taken by many other federal actors when dealing with 
the cannabis industry.  
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V.   CHALLENGES TO THE WELLNESS APPROACH 
While the policy considerations for the Wellness Approach are 
strong, serious challenges stand in the way. Given that the cannabis 
industry runs afoul of multiple federal laws,176 some critics may pre-
fer to dedicate regulation of the industry to the states. There are sev-
eral key objections that may be raised to counter the Wellness Ap-
proach. First, extending the Board’s jurisdiction may create an un-
necessary conflict with existing federal drug laws.177 Second, given 
the Board’s interpretation of the nature of work in the cannabis in-
dustry, the Board may treat a broader class of workers as not falling 
under the agricultural laborer exception of the NLRA. This may re-
sult in offering more protections than those given to employees in 
legal industries. Ultimately, however, none of these objections are 
persuasive. 
The Wellness Approach may also face considerable impediments if 
new cannabis regulations compromise enforcement of the CSA. The 
Supreme Court has expressed concern with any agency order that 
potentially interferes with existing federal law or policy.178 Since it 
may be impossible for an individual to obtain employment at a can-
nabis company without directly or indirectly contravening federal 
drug enforcement polices, the Wellness Approach may have to yield 
to the federal government’s stance on Schedule I narcotics.  
The main objective of the CSA, as articulated by the Supreme 
Court, was to “conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” in addition to combating 
recreational drug abuse.179 The text of the CSA itself reaffirms this 
purpose by stating, “Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the 
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of 
the interstate incidents of such traffic.”180 Critics may argue that en-
forcing the NLRA with respect to the illegal cannabis industry is not 
compatible with the CSA’s purpose to control the traffic of controlled 
substances throughout the United States. By giving employees in the 
industry the protections available to those in legal industries, the 
Wellness Approach could arguably incentivize more workers to enter 
into a business clearly deemed illegal by the CSA. If the courts view 
the purpose of the CSA in broad terms—as deterring and prohibiting 
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the use of controlled substances—then any step taken by the NLRB 
to legitimize the industry may well contravene the goals of the CSA. 
The Board has thus far not treated many cannabis workers as ag-
ricultural laborers, reasoning that they more closely resemble manu-
facturers than farm laborers because they transform a product from 
its raw and natural state.181 This logic could equally apply to farm 
laborers who transform any plant or animal product by processing or 
butchering it.182 If the Board defines the class of agricultural workers 
in the marijuana industry more narrowly, it may create another in-
centive for employees to enter into an industry still treated as illegal 
under federal law as well as the law of a majority of states. 
A.   Challenges Rebuffed  
The objections discussed above are not persuasive for many rea-
sons. Fundamentally, employees should not lose basic labor protec-
tions simply because the industry runs afoul of federal law. After all, 
employers are also violating the law and should not reap an unfair 
bargaining advantage as a result. Moreover, any conflict between the 
CSA and the NLRA is implicit and minor. Even if there were a genu-
ine conflict, the federal government remains free to enforce the CSA 
against industry participants. Enforcement is preferable to allowing 
unfair labor practices to continue to go unchecked. Doing so advances 
neither the purpose of the NLRA nor the purpose of the CSA. Finally, 
many employees in the cannabis industry do not neatly fit within the 
agricultural worker exception under the NLRA. The Board did not 
give cannabis industry participants protections other workers do not 
enjoy. Instead, the Board simply recognized the nature of the work 
performed by some employees in the industry. 
The conflict between the Board’s authority to enforce the NLRA 
and the potential conflict with the CSA is analogous to an issue the 
Supreme Court addressed in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB.183 In Sure-Tan, 
the Court directly confronted potential conflicts between an NLRB 
order and federal immigration policy.184 The Court concluded that the 
Board properly interpreted the NLRA to apply to undocumented 
workers because federal immigration statutes convey only a “periph-
eral concern” with the employment of illegal aliens.185 The Court not-
ed that Congress did not make it a separate criminal offense for em-
ployers to hire illegal aliens or for illegal aliens to seek employment, 
so there was “no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to 
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employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict 
with the terms” of federal immigration policy.186  
The CSA states that an employer may not knowingly or intention-
ally manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance ex-
cept as authorized by the Act.187 The CSA provides specific penalties, 
both civil and criminal, for violations.188 However, the Act’s language 
itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to affect the enforce-
ment of other laws, such as the NLRA. What is to happen, for in-
stance, when an individual is hired to work at a company whose 
business plan violates provisions in the CSA? Must the individual 
accept unfair wages? May the employer ignore federally mandated 
labor laws? Specifically, may the employer violate those labor laws 
with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot exert 
jurisdiction over it? Additionally, the CSA does not make it a sepa-
rate criminal offense when individuals seek employment in the can-
nabis industry. Thus, there is reason to conclude that application of 
the NLRA to employment practices would not necessarily conflict 
with the terms of the CSA. 
The fact that an employer’s business violates certain provisions of 
the CSA should not shield it from violations of another statute in-
volving significantly different considerations and legislative purpos-
es. Whether a cannabis enterprise is participating in the illegal sale 
and distribution of Schedule I narcotics in interstate commerce is a 
question of defining the enterprise’s business in the framework of 
national drug enforcement policies. In contrast, whether a cannabis 
enterprise is withholding earned wages or engaging in unfair labor 
practices is a matter of federal policy governing labor relations. Thus, 
enforcing labor laws will not trivialize the CSA, nor condone or en-
courage future violations of the CSA.  
The objection that the Board’s interpretation of the nature of work 
in the cannabis industry may ostensibly offer more protections to 
cannabis workers than employees in other legal industries is illusory. 
While it is true that many employees in the cannabis industry do not 
neatly fit within the agricultural laborer exception of the NLRA, by 
analyzing the duties of employees on a case-by-case basis, the Board 
will avoid extending protections not enjoyed by other workers. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
In states where cannabis is legal, employees in the industry are 
forced to make an impossible choice—risk abuse or abandon an em-
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ployment opportunity. It is unlikely that voters and legislators in-
tended to impose such a cruel predicament on cannabis workers 
when enacting these state laws. The Board should provide protection 
to cannabis employees who suffer from these adverse employment 
issues. Doing so would further one of the fundamental purposes of 
the NLRA: to promote the general welfare of employees. 
At the judicial level, courts should dismiss employers’ arguments 
that federal law precludes the Board’s jurisdiction. Federally recog-
nizing fair labor conditions is not the same as federally recognizing 
medical cannabis. Based on the many unsuccessful attempts to re-
schedule cannabis as a Schedule II drug under the CSA, it is unlikely 
that the federal government will legalize medical marijuana use in 
the near future;189 therefore, the Board needs to take action to ensure 
that workers are afforded protection in this ever-developing indus-
try.190 Federal agencies evaluating employment issues should glean 
perspective from precedent and insights of the Board in order to en-
sure cannabis workers have the same protections as other working 
Americans.  
All actors in the cannabis industry will benefit if legal protections 
for cannabis workers are enhanced. Moreover, these solutions will 
best balance the competing interests of employees and their employ-
ers. Workplace policies and conditions that are illegal should remain 
beyond the realm of marijuana politics. As it currently stands, all 
American workers are equal, but some are less equal than others.191 
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